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INERTIAL SUBSYSTEM WARNINGS AND COUPLING
DATA UNIT FAILURE INDICATIONS
STATEMENT OF ANOMALY
The inertial subsystem warning light was observed to illuminate six
times during the transearth portion of the flight. .Each illumination was
accompanied by a program warning of an inertial coupling data unit fail-
ure. The warning indications were intermittent; the :first four cleared
themselves and the last two were apparently removed by bumping an access
panel in the lower equipment bay. '. '.. '
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The coupling data unit assembly contains failure detection circuits
which monitor the performance of the assembly. - There are individual fail-
ure detect circuits for the inertial subsystem and the optical subsystem
coupling data units. Figure 1 is a functional representation of the per-
tinent circuits. A' failure discrete is sent to the computer if a failure
occurs in either subsystem coupling data; unit. The failure discrete is
sent to the computer if one or more of the following conditions exist:
a. Coarse error detect - A disagreement of approximately 30 degrees
between a read counter and the IX gimbal resolver.
b. Fine error detect - A disagreement of more than 0.7 degree be-
tween a read counter and the l6x gimbal resolver.
 ;
c. Cosine (0 - i|>) - Voltage :les.s jjhan 2 Vrms. . This voltage is nor-
mally U Vrms when the read counter;agrees with the resolver voltage.
d. Read counter limit ;cycle '- The'read counter changes the direc-
tion in which it is counting at a rate greater than 160 times a second.
e. 1^-Vdc power supply - The llj-Vdc power supply in the coupling
data unit decreases to 8 volts or less. '-', '
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DISCUSSION
The computer logic is such that the failure discrete must exist for
5 ±2 seconds before the computer generates the appropriate failure indi-
cations. The measured time delay associated with the failure discrete
was 5 seconds during the flight. The failure indications persisted for
U, 12, 16, 89^ , 10 and 38 seconds. All telemetry data directly or indi-
rectly related to the coupling data unit were reviewed and no abnormal-
ities were observed. If a real failure condition had occurred in the
monitored parameters and had lasted as long as 89^ seconds, it, would be
observable in'the data. An intermittent condition was indicated, how-
ever, with the most probable locations in (l) the failure-detect circuit
of the coupling data unit assembly, (2) the input logic in the computer,
or (3) the "A" harness (or its connectors) between the. coupling data unit
assembly and the computer.
Diagnostic tests were conducted on the returned hardware before it
was removed from the spacecraft. These tests consisted of continuous
monitoring for inertial coupling data unit failure indications, and cy-
cling the thrust vector enable relay to investigate the false gimbal
lock anomaly. The false gimbal lock anomaly discussed in section 1U.1.3
of the Apollo 16 Mission Report is not related.to this anomaly, although
the same hardware was involved in both anomalies. No abnormal indica-
tions were observed during the tests.
The coupling data unit, "A" harness, and computer were removed from
the spacecraft. A visual inspection of the harness was performed and a
meggar test was performed on the pins adjacent to the one which supplies
the failure indication to the computer.. The connectors were X-rayed and
a chemical analysis was performed on contaminants found in the connectors.
The contaminants were non-conductive and the results of all other tests
were negative.
The computer was subjected to functional tests at marginal voltage
levels, then the modules containing the input logic were subjected to
thermal, vibration, and vacuum testing at marginal voltage levels. Fi-
nally, the computer modules were depotted and those components which could
have caused the problem were X-rayed, leak_tested, electrically tested,
and visually inspected. No abnormalities were observed.
The coupling data unit was functionally tested and the module that
contains the failure-detect circuit was removed and subjected to thermal
and vibration tests at marginal voltage levels. No anomalies were ob-
served. The module was depotTed and 23 of the 30 component parts which
could have caused the problem were individually tested. Seven parts were
not tested for the following reasons:
a. One glass diode was broken during removal.
b. Two capacitors were damaged during removal.
c. Four resistors that would have to have shorted were verified to
be good before depotting.
Only one component defect was observed. A glass-body zener diode
(fig. 2) contained a loose conductive silicon particle, approximately
1 mil by 5 mils, which was large enough to short the diode. Figure 3
shows the diode with the particle in it. If this diode shorted inter-
mittently, the flight indications would result.
This type diode was not subjected to 100-percent screening for con-
taminants at the component level. However, the diode did pass all mod-
ule, assembly, and system level tests with no evidence of shorting. In
addition, this type of diode has been widely used in the guidance systems
of all manned Apollo spacecraft. There are 115 of these diodes in the
lunar module and 122 in the command module. There has been no history
of shorts caused by contaminants in any of these applications.
CONCLUSIONS
Conductive contamination in a zener diode in the failure-detect cir-
cuit of the coupling data unit assembly most likely caused the problem
since the conductive contaminant was free to move and could have shorted
the diode.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
No corrective action will be taken because an intermittent short in
any of the guidance system _applications of this_ type_of__diode_ wo.uld not
create a hazard to the crew. In any event, the cost of replacement of
all the diodes of this type would be prohibitive.
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Figure 3.- Conductive particle in glass-body zener diode,
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